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Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History
in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship
RichardA. Posnert
Using Nietzsche's great essay on the uses and disadvantages of history for life as his
jumping-offpoin Judge Posnerexamines the utility of the study of history for adjudication and
legal scholarship.He argues,following Nietzsche; that the wrong kind of historicalstudy can be
very badfor "life " including law, while the right kind-the kind deployed by a pragmaticjudge or
a policy-orientedlegal scholar-may deviate from literalaccuracy in the direction of a rhetorical
and imaginative narrative of historicalevents that can be constructively employed in a forwardlooking approachto legalproblem&

Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most
backward-looking, the most "past-dependent," of the professions. It
venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, ge-

rontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering
history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, "paradigm
shifts," and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to reorient law in a more
pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence
must come to terms with history. Where better, then, to begin an ex-

amination of the historicist approach to law than with Nietzsche's
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great essay on history?' It is one of the founding documents of pragmatism and a powerful, although oblique, challenge to conventional
methods of doing law.
I.

NIETZSCHE ON HISTORY

To understand Nietzsche's essay we'll have to distinguish the
study of history, and thus history as a way of relating to, interpreting,
or explaining the past (Geschichte), from history as simply events,
chronology, or record of the past (Historie).2 It is history in the first
sense that is Nietzsche's target. He does not deny that there are
knowable facts about things that happened in the past; he is not a
postmodernist crazy. But the sum of those facts, devoid of analysis, interpretation, or causal ascriptions, is not what we mean by historical
understanding, and such understanding is elusive. Yet Nietzsche is not,
at least in the essay that I am considering, an epistemic skeptic about
either type of history. He does not deny that we can know that Napoleon Bonaparte abdicated for the second time in 1815, or even that we
can know that Napoleon did (or did not) accelerate the emergence of
German nationalism.' He is skeptical about the social rather than the
truth value of Geschichte. He audaciously contends that the quest for
historical understanding can have a debilitating effect on meeting the
challenges of the present and the future.

1
See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantagesof History for Life, in Friedrich
Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations 57 (Cambridge 1983) (R2. Hollingdale, trans). The essay was
first published in 1874. Page references to it appear in the text of this Article. I have found only
one previous discussion of Nietzsche's essay in the legal literature: Donald P Boyle, Jr., Note,
Philosophy,History,andJudging,30 Wm & Mary L Rev 181,185-89 (1988).
2
The distinction is well articulated in Carl L. Becker, Everyman His Own Historian,37
Am Hist Rev 221 (1932); Lionel Gossman, Between History and Literature ch 9 (Harvard 1990)
(distinguishing between historical research and historical interpretation); C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A PhilosophicalStudy 233-36 (Oxford 1992) (distinguishing between historical facts, on
the one hand, and historical theory, or scientific history-"an imaginative reconstruction of the
past"-on the other). Coady takes sharp issue with Collingwood's skepticism about historical
facts. See Coady, Testimony at ch 13 (critiquing R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford
1970)). Historie corresponds to the quest for truth at the level of the trial court; and it may be
that rather similar methods and problems attend both the historical and the adjudicative quest
for factual truth, as suggested by the philosophical discourse on "testimony," well illustrated by
Coady's book, which treats both quests. But I do not pursue that relation between history and
law in this Article.
3
The idea that historical theories are a legitimate species of scientific theory is strongly
argued in Murray G. Murphey, PhilosophicalFoundations of HistoricalKnowledge ch 7 (SUNY
1994). This is not to deny the practicalindeterminacy of much historical theorizing; I give examples later. On the general question of skepticism about historical knowledge, see Arthur C.
Danto, Narrationand Knowledge (Columbia 1985). And for a powerful empirical demonstration
that historical fact is recoverable even when it concerns episodes that arouse intense political
passions, see Alan B. Spitzer, Historical Truth and Lies about the Past Reflections on Dewey,
Dreyfus, de Man, and Reagan (North Carolina 1996).
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He makes three specific points in support of this contention. The
first is that the academic study of history, the attempt to reconstruct
the past with scrupulous accuracy-the wie es eigentlich gewesen ist

("how it really was") school of Leopold von Ranke and his followers,
against which Nietzsche was writing-is disillusioning, and we need
illusions to achieve anything. "Historical verification always brings to
light so much that is false, crude, inhuman, absurd, violent that the
mood of pious illusion in which alone anything that wants to live can
live necessarily crumbles away" (p 95). People who have a potential
for greatness need "a monumentalistic conception of the past," from
which they learn that "the greatness that once existed was in any
event once possible and may thus be possible again" (p 69). "One giant calls to another across the desert intervals of time and, undisturbed by the excited chattering dwarfs who creep about beneath
them, the exalted spirit-dialogue goes on" (p 111). This conception of
history is to be contrasted with a determinist theory of history, the
"idolatry of the factual" (p 105), in which every event in history is seen
as a link in an inexorable chain of causes and effects-a view that excludes the possibility of human freedom or creativity. Ironically, the
type of historical sense that Nietzsche deplores is nowhere better illustrated than in the work of his epigone Michel Foucault, who, for example, in his history of criminal punishment since the eighteenth century,4 finds nothing of greatness or even progress but only an ever
more insidious weaving of the sinews of power, a tapestry of individual helplessness. Such a method of doing history breeds a cynicism
that is quietistic, even paralyzing.
Nietzsche's second criticism of the historical sense, which is only
superficially inconsistent with the first, is that it breeds complacency
by making us think that we are better people than our forebears. We
might call this "datism" and illustrate it by the current left-wing criticisms of Aristotle for misogyny and Washington and Jefferson for
owning slaves. History, Nietzsche observes, "leads an age to imagine
that it possesses the rarest of virtues, justice, to a greater degree than
any other age" (p 83). The concept of moral progress, which is definitionally historicist, invariably makes us look good in comparison to
our predecessors because it is assessed from the standpoint of the
present; it is our values that determine what is to count as progress.
The naive think that "to write in accord with the views of their age is
4

See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage 1977)

(Alan Sheridan, trans). Yet Foucault's historical method derives from Nietzsche, specifically the
"genealogical" methodology of On the Genealogy of Morals. See Brian Leiter, What is 'Genealogy' and What is the Genealogy?, in Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality ch 4 (forthcoming
Routledge 2001). The Genealogy was written many years after Nietzsche's essay on history; I
briefly consider the relation between the two in Part III.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[67:573

the same thing as being just"; hence "their task is to adapt the past to
contemporary triviality" (p 90).
The relation to the first criticism is that both the sense of paralysis and the sense of progress come from the same thing, the fact that
"every past ... is worthy to be condemned" (p 76). Some people react
to the horrors and follies of the past with despair and others with
complacency; neither mindset is conducive to a wholehearted, energetic, and optimistic address to current problems.
We might call the first criticism a criticism of history as belittling
the past and the second a criticism of history as glorifying the present.
Nietzsche's third criticism of the historical sense-call it belittling the
present-is his most interesting and least developed. It was developed
further by Max Weber, who in this respect is another of Nietzsche's
epigonesS and in relation to literary creativity by Harold Bloom. It is
that a lively consciousness of the past induces a sense of belatedness.
It makes us feel like "latecomers," living "in the old age of mankind"
(pp 83, 109), and to old age "there pertains an appropriate senile occupation, that of looking back, of reckoning up, of closing accounts, of
seeking consolation through remembering what has been, in short historical culture" (p 109).
This point is related to Nietzsche's first criticism in inducing a
sense of hopelessness, futility, or incapacity and despite appearances is
not inconsistent with the second (that the study of history induces
complacency). We may think we've made moral progress, and of
course economic, scientific, and technological progress as well, but we
cannot imagine ourselves on a plane with Jesus, Socrates, the Buddha,
and the other great moral innovators of the past. And where we have
made unquestionable progress it is due largely to specialization. We
cannot imagine a scientist of today having the breadth of achievement
as a Newton, or an economist having the breadth of an Adam Smith,
or a biologist who could have as revolutionary an impact as Darwin.
We cannot imagine a conqueror on the scale of Alexander the Great,
or a military genius to equal Napoleon, or that there will ever be a
Chief Justice of the United States to rival John Marshall."
These pessimistic predictions could reflect just a lack of imagination; Nietzsche is far from endorsing the feeling of belatedness that
an immersion in history creates. In fact, since 1874 a number of giants
5

Max Weber, The ProtestantEthic and the Spirit of Capitalism 180-83 (Scribner 1958)

(Talcott Parsons, trans).
6 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety ofInfluence:A Theory of Poetry 49-73 (Oxford 1973).
7 Holmes seems to have had a sense of belatedness in relation to Marshall. See Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., John Marshall,in Richard A. Posner, ed, The Essential Holmes: Selections
from the Letters: Speeches, Judicial Opinions and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmeg Jr.

206 (Chicago 1992).
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(a category that includes monsters as well as geniuses and saints) have
crossed the world stage, including Freud, Yeats, Einstein, Wittgenstein,
Lenin, Hitler, Ghandi, Churchill, Kafka, Weber, Holmes, Joyce,
Stravinsky, and Picasso. What seems to be true, however, is that the
scope and possibility of genius, of greatness, of true individualism and
breathtaking individual achievement diminish, and a sense of belatedness becomes marked, as greater and greater areas of human life
are brought under the rule of rationality by the trend to specialization
(division of labor), to bureaucratic (as distinct from charismatic or tyrannical) governance, and to universal education, media-induced sophistication, the automation of many tasks formerly requiring human
skills, the increasing utility of natural and social science in addressing
social and personal problems rationally and systematically, and (as
part of the advance of science and technology) improved therapeutic
intervention to correct physical and mental defects and normalize abnormal personalities. Earlier generations, including generations far
earlier than Nietzsche's, had a sense of belatedness; you can find it in
Hesiod, in Homer's generation. But modern conditions make it more
plausible than ever before.
The sense of belatedness has an undercurrent of complacency as
well as of defeatism, which relates the third of Nietzsche's criticisms of
the historical sense to the second. If humanity has reached a collective
old age, this means that it has experienced maturity-has, in other
words, peaked-and so there is a temptation to equate humankind's
current "miserable condition" to "a completion of world-history ... so

that for Hegel the climax and terminus of the world-process coincided
with his own existence in Berlin" (p 104). Yet what we think of as civilization is only about 5,000 years old. For all we know, there may be a
thousand, a hundred thousand, or even a million or more epochs of
that length before homo sapiens departs the scene (perhaps for other
planets). So, in a curious sense, the historical perspective, the perspective that makes us feel like latecomers, distorts a proper sense of
where we are in history.
The third criticism may seem to be in tension with the first and
second in targeting a form of monumentalistic historicism in which the
greatness of the past is highlighted-a form that might seem the very
opposite of the belittling historicism that is the target of the other
criticisms. But the tension dissolves when we recognize that the type
of monumentalistic history decried in the third criticism is the type
that belittles the present, which is as debilitating as belittling the past.
The Lilliputian historians deprive the present generation of needed
models of achievement (those giants calling to each other over the
desert intervals of time) or breed a contemptuous attitude toward the
past, while the belittling monumentalizers "do not desire to see new
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greatness emerge: their means of preventing it is to say 'Behold,
greatness already exists!' ... They act as though their motto were: let
the dead bury the living" (p 72).
Nietzsche does not argue that the study of history has no possible
value. This is apparent from his commending the type of monumentalistic history that exhibits to the present achievable models from the
past. That is history "in the service of the future and the present and
not for the weakening of the present or for depriving a vigorous future of its roots" (p 77). It is thus history "in the service of life" in
which "[t]he study of history is something salutary and fruitful for the
future only as the attendant of a mighty new current of life, of an
evolving culture for example, that is to say only when it is dominated
and directed by a higher force and does not itself dominate and direct" (p 67). The study of history should be oriented toward enlarging
our "plastic power," which is "the capacity to develop out of oneself
in one's own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is
past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds" (p 62). In short, "history belongs above all to
the man of deeds and power, to him who fights a great fight, who
needs models, teachers, comforters and cannot find them among his
contemporaries" (p 67). Still, if a certain kind of history is bad for you,
a certain kind of forgetfulness must be good for you: this is the most
arresting implication of the essay. Mythmaking through selective remembrance and selective forgetting is Nietzsche's conception of socially worthwhile history.
Nietzsche's criticisms of the study of history are psychological in
character; too much history, or history of the wrong kind (psychologically wrong, not inaccurate-Nietzsche does not value accuracy for its
own sake"), fans emotions that. impede achievement. Any doubt that
Nietzsche was on to something has been dispelled byevents in Yugoslavia; the Serbian preoccupation with history, and in particular with
the (possibly mythical) Battle of Kosovo between the Turks and the
Serbs in 1389, is bad for the Serbs, as well as for their neighbors. The
Serbs could do with a dose of forgetting.
There is also reason to be concerned about untoward cognitive
consequences of studying history, though Nietzsche barely hints at
them. Historical knowledge takes up space in the brain, leaving less
room for other intellectual material. It is not useless knowledge, at
least if its emotional effects are put to one side; it provides a stock of
precedents that can be used to solve current problems. But precedents
8
"History in the service of life can never be scientific history." Werner Dannhauser, Introduction to History in the Service and Disservice of Life, in Friedrich Nietzsche, Unmodern
Observations73,79 (Yale 1990) (William Arrowsmith, ed).
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provide good solutions to current problems only if the present resembles the past very closely. If it does not, then a person who "only repeats what he has heard, learns what is already known, imitates what
already exists" (p 123) will not be able to solve any of these problems.
History provides a template for framing and "sizing" contemporary
problems; but the template may prove to be a straitjacket. The use of
historical analogies ("another Munich") is full of pitfalls. 9 Hence the
adage that the only lesson of history is that there are no lessons of history.
I find Nietzsche's essay on history immensely stimulating, fruitful,
and useful, but I do not want to leave the impression that I agree with
it entirely. His emphasis on a purely instrumental approach to history
writing could be thought a license for rewriting history, the sort of
thing that the Soviet Union did and that Orwell parodied in Nineteen
Eighty-Four.Nietzsche's essay illuminates a parallel instrumental conception of history-writing by judges and other legal professionals, and
it is a conception open to similar objections to those that can be
lodged against Nietzsche's essay.

II.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF HISTORY
FOR ADJUDICATION

We should not expect Nietzsche's criticisms of historiography to
be fully applicable to the law's use of history. Nietzsche was preoccupied with the concept of genius;10 and his criticisms of the historical approach seem motivated primarily by a sense of the incompatibility of
genius with a certain kind of historical knowledge or sense. The essay
does two things, however, that bear importantly on law. First, it opens
up the question whether the historical sense is an unalloyed blessing
(and thus whether, for example, Santayana's aphorism that those who
forget history are condemned to repeat it is the truism that it is usually
taken to be); it problematizes what had been taken for granted. Second, and related, it invites us to think of historical inquiry and the historical sense as instruments rather than things of intrinsic value oriented exclusively to truth. Truth is a good, but there are other goods,
which forgetting or even forging the historical record might promote.
9 A more contemporary and less familiar example is how the "template" of the Battle of
the Bulge contributed to the failure of the American military command in Vietnam to take adequate measures in preparation for the 1968 Tet offensive. The command believed that the enemy
was on the ropes and might, like the Germans in 1944, launch a desperate offensive; but the fact
that the German offensive had failed and that Germany had been utterly defeated within
months bred complacency about the likely consequences of such an offensive by the North Vietnamese. See James J.Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failurein War 129-32 (Corneli 1991).
10 The notion that in the nineteenth century "genius" was a career, and one to which
Nietzsche aspired, is argued in Carl Pletsch, Young Nietzsche: Becoming a Genius (Free Press
1991).
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As Nietzsche says elsewhere, "there exist very salutary and productive
errors.""

The critique of history that Nietzsche's essay inaugurates, more
than the details of his critique, has major implications for legal theory.
Law is history-laden to a remarkable extent, though less so (as I am
about to argue) than is sometimes supposed. We can distinguish three
different types of use to which law has put history: a rhetorical, an informational, and a normative.
A. History as Idol and as Mask
Extreme versions of a tendency to make, or at least pretend to
make, the past rule the present in law are found in Blackstone, who
thought the aim of the common law of England should be to revive
the customary law of Anglo-Saxon England, 2 which is to say the law
of a regime that had been extinguished 700 years earlier; and in Saviguy,the founder of the historical school of jurisprudence, who thought
that the study of Roman law was the key to improving modem law."
But Blackstone's version (or Savigny's) is just that-an extreme. It
isn't fundamentally different from the belief held by a great many
modem American lawyers, judges, and law professors that the answers
to modem questions of constitutional law can be found in the text or
background of the Constitution, a documentary palimpsest most of
which was drafted more than two centuries ago.
A moment's thought will suggest another possibility, howeverthat the ostensible use of history, whether by Blackstone or Savigny or
the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, is not a sign of thralldom to
history but of the opposite, of bending history to the service of life,
Nietzsche-fashion. Neither Blackstone nor a modem judge (or
shadow-judge law professor) is comfortable saying, "This is what the
law ought to be today, regardless of what it was yesterday, because we
have new problems and need new solutions.' '14 That is the kind of
thing a politician might say, but it doesn't sound like the utterance of a
legal professional, as it has nothing of the esoteric or the arcane about
it. The professional wants to say, "I can employ my special skills to
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, David Strauss,the Confessor and the Writer,in Nietzsche, Untimely
Meditations 3,3 (cited in note 1).
12
See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 413 (Chicago 1979);
Thomas A. Green, Introduction,in William Blackstone, 1 Commentarieson the Laws of England
i,iii,
xii(Chicago 1979).
13 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence 139-41 (Littlewood 1831) (Abraham Hayward, trans).
14
But see Carl E. Schorske, Thinking with History: Explorations in the Passage to Mod-

ernism 88 (Princeton 1998) ("[W]hen men produce revolutionary changes, they screen themselves from their own frightening innovations by dressing themselves in the cultural clothing of a
past to be restored.").
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find the already existing solution to the new (or new-seeming) problem in authoritative decisions made centuries ago. 15 This claim is an
illusion, as legal realists and critics of lawyers' history like to point
out.16 Think of the sexual privacy cases, which culminated in Roe v
8 was decided in
Wade' 7 The first of them, Griswold v Connecticut,"
1965, a century after the Fourteenth Amendment, which furnished its
ostensible ground, was adopted. The law of free speech barely existed
before the 1950s-even that late its scope was distinctly limited because of fear of communism-and yet it is supposed to have been
promulgated in 1789, when the First Amendment was ratified. Much
of what passes for constitutional law is a modem construct, but it is
defended by reference to ancient (as Americans measure historical
time) texts to which it is tenuously and often only opportunistically
linked. But though its ancientness is an illusion, Nietzsche teaches us
that historical illusions can be empowering, can free us from the dead
hand of the past. The legal profession's use of history is a disguise that
allows the profession to innovate without breaching judicial etiquette,
which deplores both novelty and a frank acknowledgement of judicial
discretion and likes to pretend that decisions by nonelected judges can
be legitimated by being shown to have democratic roots in some past
legislative or constitutional enactment. Since the most convincing deceptions are those rooted in self-deception (because then the deceiver
is not in danger of giving himself away), one is not surprised that many
lawyers and judges think of law as the application to the present of the
lessons of the past as reflected in statutes, reported decisions, and
other materials created in the past to govern the future. Yet the truth
is that, for the most part, these past settlements of disputes frame and
limit, but do not dictate, the outcome of today's cases.
The law's rhetorical use of history is entwined with the idolatry of
the past that is a conspicuous feature of conventional legal thought
15 This is very much the spirit of Savigny's opposition to the codification of law. He described pre-code law, particularly Roman law, as "the scientific element, properly so termed,
whereby our calling acquires a scientific character." Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age at 163
(cited in note 13). See also Hermann Kantorowicz, Savigny and the HistoricalSchool of Law, 53
L Q Rev 326 (1937); Edwin W. Patterson, Historicaland Evolutionary Theories of Law, 51 Colum
L Rev 681, 686-89 (1951); Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes; and the Law and Economics of
Possession,86 Va L Rev 535 (2000).
16 See, for example, Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S Ct
Rev 119; Martin S. Flaherty, History 'Lite' in Modern American Constitutionalism,95 Colum L
Rev 523 (1995); Laura Kalman, Border PatrokReflections on the Turn to History in Legal Schol-

arship,66 Fordham L Rev 87 (1997); Barry Friedman and Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution,147 U Pa L Rev 1 (1998). For a recent study that casts great doubt on a key orthodoxy
of constitutional lawyers' history-the impact of.Madison's constitutional theory on the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution-see Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 Harv L Rev
611 (1999).
17 410 US 113 (1973).
18 381 US 479 (1965).
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and that could conceivably be likened to the type of "monumentalistic" history-writing that Nietzsche commends. A backward-looking
orientation invites the criticism that the dead should not be allowed to
rule the living, and one way to rebut it is to argue that our ancestors
had a freshness of insight or power of thought that is denied to us
modems; they are our betters and we should be content to be in thrall
to them. This is a mistake, I'll argue.
Nietzsche does not consider how an essentially deceptive conception of the law's relation to the past can be maintained year after year,
decade after decade, century after century. Even in today's United
States-a society having a much higher level of education, legal sophistication, disrespect for authority, intellectual diversity, and individual liberty than Imperial Germany in Nietzsche's day-the mask remains firmly in place. Most people take for granted that the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions, even in the area of sexual and reproductive liberty, are in some meaningful sense rooted in the Constitution itself. Probably even most legal professionals believe this, though
perhaps their belief is that morally dubious form of quasi-belief that
Sartre called "bad faith." In the rhetoric of constitutional law, Nietzsche's illusionistic concept of historical writing holds sway. The judges
invoke the authority of the ancient texts, deify the framers (great
calling to great over the desert intervals of time), and in short create a
fictive history in service of a contemporary, pragmatic project. Most
professors of constitutional law, even such "theorists" as Ronald
Dworkin, cheer them on, though sometimes opposing their own fictive
history to that of the judges. So firmly is the mask in place that even
disinterested critics of the Supreme Court's historical sense are more
likely to call for better history than for no history. The result is to marginalize their criticism by making it seem an argument in a technical
dispute over details of historiography.
Dworkin is no "originalist" in the sense of someone who believes
that modem constitutional issues should be decided by reference to
the meanings that the words of the Constitution bore in the eighteenth century or to the mental horizons of the framers. Nor is Frank
Michelman or Cass Sunstein. But as Laura Kalman points out, Sunstein and Michelman, like Dworkin, think it important to construct a
historical pedigree for their desired constitutional interpretations; they
want "to imbue the past with prescriptive authority."19 But, Kalman
argues, it is a constructed rather than a found past. "The republican
revivalists [Michelman and Sunstein] appropriated historians for advocacy purposes, permitting the present to overwhelm the past."20
19
20

Kalnan, 66 Fordham L Rev at 103 (cited in note 16).
Id at 107.
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They employ "the rhetoric of originalism. ''2' Kalman considers this
rhetoric an indispensable condition of judicial innovation, given our
legal culture. Maybe so (though I'll express some skepticism about this
later); and maybe the academics are just trying to speak a language
that judges will understand rather than fooling themselves that they
are doing history. But we should understand that what they are doing
is indeed rhetoric, and not historiography. Later I shall argue that,
paradoxical as this may seem, real originalists are less historicist than
many antioriginalists-originalism is a response to historicism.
Kalman thinks that constitutional theorists "see through" their
own historicism." I worry that some judges fool themselves into
thinking that history delivers the solutions to even the most difficult
and consequential legal issues and thus allows them to duck the really
difficult question-the soundness of the solutions as a matter of public
policy. I think that at least some of the Justices of the Supreme Court
would be hesitant to expand states' rights in the name of the Constitution if they realized that constitutional history provided no guidance
to resolving such issues as whether the Eleventh Amendment (which
merely forbids a citizen of one state to sue another state in federal
court) codifies a far-reaching doctrine of state sovereign immunity
even from suits based on federal law.
Path Dependence: Holmes and the Historical School

B.

Not in constitutional doctrine or outcomes, but in a number of
other respects, the law is in thrall to history, and not merely as a matter
of judicial psychology. This point can be made perspicuous with the
aid of the economists' concept of path dependence, which means that
where you end up may depend on where you start out from, even if,
were it not for having started where you did, a different end point
would be better. The best-known, although quite possibly spurious, example in the economic literature concerns the typewriter keyboard.
According to the economic historian Paul David, the keyboard was
designed to limit typing speed in order to prevent constant jamming of
the keys. The jamming problem disappeared with the advent of electric typewriters and word processing, yet we are stuck with the old
keyboard because the costs of getting agreement among manufacturers on a new keyboard and of "retooling" the millions of people
who were trained on and have become habituated to the old one are
prohibitive. We can thus expect to observe path dependence when
21
22
23

Id at 124.
See id at 110-11.

See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am Econ Rev 332 (1985).
For a general analysis of the economics of path dependence, see Stanley M. Besen and Joseph
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transition costs are high relative to the benefits of change, and they
tend to be high when transition requires a high degree of coordination.
David's premise, that the conventional keyboard is inefficient, has
been subjected to searing criticism as part of a larger questioning of
the economic importance of path dependence.24 I do not want to get
into those issues; whatever the situation in competitive markets, where
there are powerful incentives for efficiency, there can be little doubt
that path dependence is an important phenomenon in law.2 Some evidence of this is that the convergence of legal systems is much slower
than the convergence of technology and economic institutions. The
laws and legal institutions of the different states of the United States
differ more than the economic practices and institutions of the states
do, and the differences are still greater and more mysterious in a
cross-country comparison, even when the comparison is confined to
countries whose economic and political systems, and levels of education and income, are similar to ours.
It is hard to believe, for example, that the heavy use of the civil
jury in the United States is unrelated to differences between English
and Continental public administration that go back to the Middle
Ages.2 It is unlikely that if we were starting from scratch we would
make the right to trial by jury turn on whether the plaintiff was seeking damages or an injunction-a distinction rooted in the historical
accident that England developed two separate court systems for the
two types of relief-or that statutes of limitations would vary as much
as they do across states7 or that the level of detail in American law
would be as great as it is, or that there would be as many procedural
differences as there are between tort suits and breach of contract suits
(since many wrongs can be pleaded under either heading-and ana-
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25 See Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-And Through It, 65 Fordham L Rev 1627,164041 (1997), making a similar point. But Kramer attaches normative significance to law's path dependence, as I do not.
26 See James Bradley Thayer, A PreliminaryTreatise on Evidence at the Common Law 2-3
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lytically tort and contract are interchangeable2). The modem law is
full of vestiges of early law. If we were starting from scratch, we could
design and (even with due regard for political pressures) would adopt
a more efficient system, and this implies that there must be formidable
obstacles to changing the existing one.
The law's obeisance to the past at the expense of the present and
the future thus need not be attributed to a mystical, perhaps quasireligious, veneration of ancient ways. It could just reflect transition
costs, though here they arise not from a coordination problem, as in
the typewriter-keyboard example, but from problems of information.
It may be that judges, and perhaps legal professionals in general, are
so bereft of good sources of information for deciding novel cases or
reforming the institutions of the law to keep up with social change
that their most efficient method of deciding cases and resolving issues
of institutional design is to rely heavily on precedent, as is brought out
in Dworkin's analogy of the common law to the writing of a chain
novel.n The more heavily the judges rely on precedent, the more likely
is current doctrine to be determined by history rather than by current
needs.
We might describe this as the result of a kind of rational inertia.
Legislators are not constrained by precedent, but their ability to innovate is limited by the inertia built into the legislative process, especially at the federal level in the United States. By creating an essentially tricameral legislature (the Senate, the House, and the President
with his veto power), the Constitution makes it difficult to enact statutory law; but once enacted, it is, by the same token, difficult to change,
because the legislative procedures for amending an existing statute
are the same as those for promulgating a brand new statute. The Constitution, being difficult to amend, is itself a potent source of path dependence in the provisions that do not lend themselves to aggiornamentothrough interpretation.
Path dependence is a less serious problem at the doctrinal than at
the institutional level of the law. By rejecting strict stare decisis
American judges have empowered themselves to alter doctrine to
keep abreast of changing circumstances. As a result, the structure of
common law doctrine (broadly understood as doctrine forged in the
process of deciding cases, whether or not they technically are common
law cases) seems on the whole pretty efficient30 Generally worded
provisions of statutes, constitutions, and contracts allow judges to mold
them to current needs and values. Guido Calabresi has proposed that
28
29
30
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courts be allowed to "overrule" archaic statutes as if they were obsolete precedents," and it is possible to argue that courts are already
doing this, only calling what they do "interpretation." The law also
fights off the dead hand of the past directly by refusing to enforce
some of the limitations that the makers of wills attempt to impose on
their bequests and by the closely related cy pres doctrine, which allows
charitable foundations to circumvent some of the conditions in the instrument creating the foundation.3 2 Even at the institutional level, the
legal system has proved resourceful in seeking to lift the dead hand of
the past. The Seventh Amendment is immovable, but by shrinking the
size of the civil jury (from the traditional 12 to 6), by expanded use of
summary judgment to take cases away from juries, and by subtle pressures to substitute bench trials for jury trials, the federal judicial system has curtailed and domesticated the originally intended operation
of the amendment.
Path dependence in law resembles another important concept,
that of law's autonomy. To the extent that a field, whether it be music,
mathematics, or law, is autonomous, developing in accordance with its
internal laws, its current state will bear an organic relation to its previous states. Many legal thinkers have aspired to make law an autonomous discipline in this sense, but it is a questionable aspiration.
My own view is that law is better regarded as a servant of social need, 3
a conception which severs the law from any inherent dependence on
its past.
The concept of path dependence can help us to distinguish between two influential nineteenth-century versions of legal historicism,
that of Savigny and that of Holmes. Savigny believed that every nation, every "race" (in a cultural rather than biological sense), had a
pre-institutional, indeed primitive, law-spirit, and that modern law had
to conform to that spirit to be sound.3 Hence the object of legal study
and reform "is to trace every established system to its root, and thus
discover an organic principle, whereby that which still has life, may be
separated from that which is lifeless and only belongs to history." 3
This is one of those aphorisms that seem sensible and even compelling
at first glance but do not survive critical scrutiny. Even if (as seems
very dubious) every modem legal doctrine has "evolved" in the sense
See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard 1982).
For example, the cy pres doctrine allowed the March of Dimes Foundation to redirect its
resources from polio to lung diseases when the polio vaccine largely eradicated polio.
33 As I argue in Richard A. Posner, The Problematicsof Moral and Legal Theory ch 4
31
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of developing out of some ancient, perhaps even prelegal, norm, why
should the vitality or lifelessness of the modem doctrine depend on
the vitality of the seed?
Holmes's historicism may owe some debt to Savigny, because
the method primarily employed in The Common Law is that of tracing back modem doctrines of the common law to their ancient roots.3
But the spirit of Holmes's inquiry is entirely different from Savigny's
(or from the spirit of Burke, which resembles and influenced Savigny's
historicism). There is no veneration of the past. "The substance of the
law at any given time," Holmes writes, "pretty nearly corresponds, so
far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its
form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past. '"3 "The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit
the meaning which it has received."3' This is just the idea of path dependence. The past exerts an inertialforce.
Holmes had the advantage over Savigny of writing after Darwin.
The process that Holmes describes is indeed an evolutionary one, in
which adaptation is gradual because the existing forms cannot be
shucked off overnight, just as the giraffe's long neck does not develop
overnight in response to the appearance of a food supply at a height.
This is why, as G. Edward White explains, Holmes recognized that "the
law is simultaneously influenced by internal professional and extralegal factors, and that legal doctrine is the product of a complex interaction between those sets of factors. ,, The "internal professional" factors are the concerns with continuity and precedent that retard instant
adaptation to changed circumstances and that correspond in evolutionary biology to the biological constraints on the pace and direction
of evolutionary change.
Holmes's historicism is what might be called a corrective historicism. History is used to explain the existence of doctrines that have
become vestigial; for once they are recognized as mere survivals, the
path for reform is clearer. Criticizing Savigny and his followers, who
believed that in Roman law possessory rights were limited to possessors who claimed ownership of the thing possessed, and who therefore
thought that modern law in providing possessory remedies to lessees,
36 See G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self 149 (Oxford 1993).
37 And here it is germane to note that "down to the Renaissance at any rate, Roman law
was the common law of all Europe." James E.G. de Montmorency, FriedrichCarl von Savigny, in
John Macdonell and Edward Manson, eds, Great Jurists of the World 561, 586 (Little, Brown
1914).
38
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bailees, and others who lacked such claims had sacrificed principle to
convenience, Holmes remarked:
I cannot see what is left of a principle which avows itself inconsistent with convenience and the actual course of legislation. The
first call of a theory of law is that it should fit the facts. It must
explain the observed course of legislation. And as it is pretty certain that men will make laws which seem to them convenient
without troubling themselves very much what principles are encountered by their legislation, a principle which defies convenience is likely to wait some time before it finds itself permanently
realized.'
C. The Past as Normative
There is a fundamental difference between relying on the past either because we lack good information about how to cope with the
present and future or because legal innovation involves heavy transition costs, and treating the past as normative, as when Paul Kahn says
that legal arguments "begin from a commitment to the past,"4 2 and
that "the rule of law is for us the manner in which the authoritative
character of the past appears,"' 3 or when Anthony Kronman says that
"the past is, for lawyers and judges, a repository not just of information but of value, with the power to confer legitimacy on actions in the
present," and "the past deserves to be respected merely because it is
the past,"4 or when Ronald Dworkin says that "the past must be allowed some special power of its own in court, contrary to the pragmatist's claim that it must not."45 Why must? A possible answer is that
justice demands that like cases be treated alike, and the happenstance
that one case was decided long ago and the other is a current case
does not sever the likeness. Fair enough; but it is not pastness that
must on this view be allowed a special power; it is likeness. The only
function of pastness is to remind us that the fact that a case was decided a year ago or a century ago does not in and of itself entitle a
court deciding a current case to ignore it. The court must have a reason to ignore it, just as it must have a reason to ignore any source of
possible guidance to deciding the present case.
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Another possible answer to the "must" question is that events in
the past can create commitments for the future. Contracts in which
performance is to occur over time are the most obvious example. Constitutions and statutes can be thought of as kinds of contract, and a
judge-made rule might be conceived of as a promise to the community
to decide future cases in conformity with the rule. But these are at
best analogies. The sense in which today's Americans "consented" to
the provisions of the Constitution and of statutes is highly attenuated
in comparison to the consent that attends the signing of a contract,
and the rejection of rigid stare decisis makes judge-made rules revocable, attenuating the reliance that they invite and receive. Reliance
interests are, though, an example of a commitment that past practices
or pronouncements can create; and quite apart from specific reliance,
there is a general value in a kind of social or political inertia that takes
certain issues off the agenda, such as how many senators each state
should have. It is often more important that something be settled than
that it be settled just right. To reject historical piety is not to endorse a
restless experimentation with political and legal institutions. It is
merely to reject piety; but in law that is not a mean accomplishment.
A look into history will often bring to light information that is
relevant to dealing with the present and the future. But when this
happens, it is the information itself that should shape our response to
current problems, rather than the past as such; the past is just a data
source. If the only reason that can be given for deciding one way
rather than another is that this is how it was done in the past, it is a
feeble reason, though good enough if there is no reason to change.
The database conception of history is now fairly well understood in
relation to judges' use of "legislative history," the background out of
which a statute or a constitutional provision emerges. What an influential member or committee of the legislature said about the meaning of
a bill that was later enacted, or what were the historical events out of
which the bill welled, are data that may be helpful in determining the
meaning of the enactment. This history is not normative, but just a
convenient body of relevant data.
Commitment, reliance, information, even inertia are reasons for
standing by decisions made in the past. But to call the past itself normative is a mystification. It might be an indispensable mystification if
the general public believed it, because then the legitimacy of judicial
decisions might depend upon judges' accepting the yoke of history.
The general public believes something like this-that decisions must
be "rooted" in authoritative sources of law-but is pretty casual about
the sources. Uninterested in and uninformed about history, the public
is unlikely to demand that modem cases be decided consistently with
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ancient texts and precedents. Otherwise Robert Bork would have
been confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice.
Dworkin himself makes no claims to be a historian, and so in
practice, as opposed to preaching, treats the past in just the opportunistic way commended by Nietzsche, rarely looking farther into
the past than the New Deal, or more commonly the Warren Court, for
benchmarks by which to evaluate current decisions. ' The benchmarks
are arbitrary. They are an artifact of the choice of which historical period is to count as normative, a choice determined by Dworkin's
ideological preferences. The history of the Supreme Court is one of
cycles rather than progress- cycles of innovation and retrenchment, of
liberal thrust and conservative parry, conservative thrust and liberal
parry. Disinterested judicial historiography would enforce the lesson
of cynicism that Nietzsche found so debilitating. Maybe that is why we
have so little such historiography.
Another bad reason to embrace a historically oriented jurisprudence is a belief that the quality of the people who make law,
mainly judges and legislators, has declined. This is a typical "golden
age" fallacy (the type of monumentalistic history-writing, criticized by
Nietzsche, that belittles the present) -that the world is going to hell in
a handbasket-and is as tenacious as it is naive. It reflects the aging
process, which sheds a golden glow over our youth (the nostalgia fallacy, we might call it); selection bias, which leads us to compare the
best of the past with the average of the present because time has not
yet sorted the best of the present from the average; related to both, a
tendency to hero worship that requires a temporally distant hero to
make worship a remotely plausible attitude; and, in recent times, the
growth of specialization, which makes us feel smaller than our predecessors. If we corrected for these factors that give us a distorted sense
of the past, a sense that belittles the present, we would realize that the
framers of the Constitution, and outstanding judges such as John Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Jackson, and Hand, were, with the
exception of Holmes, who had world-class philosophical and literary
talents, and Madison, who had penetrating political insights, merely
very able lawyers. (Some recent candidates for deification, such as
Earl Warren, William Brennan, and Harry Blackmun, are not uniformly acknowledged to have been even that.) There are many
equally able lawyers today; if the nation decided it wanted a new Constitution, there would be no shortage of competent drafters. And even
if the lawyers and judges of the fabled past were abler than the cur46 That Dworkin's talk about keeping faith with the past does no actual work in his constitutional jurisprudence is argued in Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's 'Moral Reading' of the Constitution,65 Fordham

L Rev 1269 (1997).
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rent crop, they knew so much less than we about conditions today that
it is ludicrous to accord them a mystical power over the present. A
more plausible view is not that they were abler, but that they rose to
the occasion presented by the unusual circumstances in which they
found themselves. Crisis brings out the best (or the worst) in people.
Harry Truman and even Abraham Lincoln might have been commonplace Presidents under present conditions.
Any votary of deciding modem constitutional cases in conformity
with the "original intent" of the framers or ratifiers is thus making a
mistake if his ground is that the juvenescence of the United States was
the golden age of legal thought. The only good reason for originalism
is pragmatic and has to do with wanting to curtail judicial discretion
and thus to transfer political power from judges to legislators, including the framers and ratifiers of constitutional provisions and amendments. (The bad reason, because it is question-begging, is that judicial
decisions lack legitimacy if they are the product of an exercise of judicial discretion; the question begged is the validity of the idea of legitimacy that compels this conclusion.) It may not be a very good reason,
for there are other ways of limiting judicial discretion besides trying to
tether judges to a time line. My point is only that criticisms of originalism as bad history miss the point of originalism. The point is to
curb judicial discretion by adopting a mechanical method of interpretation, one essentially lexicographical and algorithmic rather than historicist.
I have suggested that a policy of generally adhering to precedent,
that is, of deciding cases in the same way that like cases have been decided previously, both economizes on judges' and lawyers' time and
enables the decided cases to serve as guides to persons who want to
avoid being sued.4' The policy need have nothing to do with a veneration of the past unless it is pushed to the point at which judges, like
foreign-policy makers preoccupied with historical analogies (a form of
precedent), prefer strained analogies to acknowledging the need to
deal with novel issues without the crutch of precedent. Almost everyone would agree that a historical analogy cannot be used as a cookie
cutter that will stamp out the answer to a current issue of policy. This
is easy to see because history never repeats itself exactly. At best the
historical analogy furnishes a lesson that may be applicable to a current problem. In the case of legal precedent, the cookie-cutter method
will work sometimes; some cases are undeniably identical in all conceivably relevant respects to previously decided cases. But when they
are merely "analogous," there is no metric of similarity that will enable a later case to be decided by reference to a former one, just as
47
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there is no metric of similarity that would have enabled Lyndon Johnson to figure out whether abandoning South Vietnam to her fate
would have been "another Munich."
Historical analogies are causal; the Munich accord is used to show
that if we act in a certain way, the same dire outcome will follow. Legal
precedent is normative; the new case is to be decided the same way as
the former one because they are relevantly alike. But the pitfalls are
similar. Notions of likeness are vague. The valid use of either type of
analogy, the historical or the legal, is to extract a principle, or consideration, which can then be used to illuminate a subsequent event or
case. In neither case, then, is history normative; it is merely a source of
potentially useful data.
In the case of history, arguments from analogy are plagued by the
difficulty of evaluating counterfactual historical assertions.4 We cannot rerun history without the Munich accord and see what would have
happened. To assess a historical counterfactual, we need a historical
law,49 such as that appeasement invites further aggression; if we are
confident that the law is sound (a confidence hard to come by in historical inquiry, however), we can predict the consequences of an act of
appeasement, such as the Munich accord. But not otherwise. Similarly,
to make a legal argument from analogy requires the legal analyst to
extract a principle from the prior cases that covers the current case.50
The prior cases, as such, are not normative any more than history is.
D. The Optimal Age of Judges
The historicist approach to law has, perhaps surprisingly, implications for the optimal age of judges, a subject about which the extensive
scholarly literature on judges and courts is largely silent. 1 The older
one gets, the more one lives in the past. A very young person has little
to draw on in his past by way of resources for coping with the present,
but his powers of imagination and ratiocination are at their peak. An
Professional historians acknowledge this problem. See, for example, Peter Novick, That
Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American HistoricalProfession (Cambridge
48
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old person has waning powers of imagination and ratiocination, but a
rich store of recollections to use as templates-as "precedents" in almost a literal sense-for solving new problems by comparing them
with old ones. The young person can always read about the past, but
what a person takes away from what he reads depends critically on
what he brings to his reading. The past is less vivid to one who reads
about it than to one who has lived it.
It may not be an accident that the average age of judges is lower
in Continental legal systems than in common law jurisdictions. The
proximate cause of the difference is that Continental judiciaries are
career judiciaries; people enter them shortly after they get their law
degree, while in common law systems judges generally are lateral entries from practice or teaching. Continental adjudication is more formalistic, more "logical," than Anglo-American adjudication, and there
is, concomitantly, less emphasis on adherence to precedents. Because
logic is more a tool of the young for solving problems, and precedent
more a tool of the old, we should not be surprised to find younger
judges in a legal system that emphasizes logic and older judges in one
that emphasizes precedent. I acknowledge, however, the possibility
that the causation is the reverse of what I've described-that it is the
character of the Anglo-American judicial career that is responsible for
the less formalistic character of Anglo-American adjudication.
E. The Historicist Judge versus the Pragmatic Judge
The historically oriented judge that I have been describing-this
elderly chap who wants to decide cases in a way that will display their
pedigree, their continuity with earlier cases, statutes, or constitutional
provisions-may seem poles apart from the pragmatic judge, who
wants to decide cases in the way that will best promote, within the
constraints of the judicial role, the goals of society. The pragmatic
judge uses history as a resource, but does not venerate the past or believe that it ought to have a "special power" over the present. As
Holmes memorably remarked, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV."'n Yet the two types of judge may not be as different as they seem.
I said earlier that history provides a useful mask for decisions reached
on other grounds. I add here that it is almost always a mask because of
the indeterminacy of most historical inquiries of the sort that might be
thought to bear on legal decisionmaking; and behind the mask may be
a pragmatist.

52 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Posner, The Essential Holmes 160, 170
(cited in note 7).
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I am not arguing that the facts of history lie beyond our ken, that
the historically oriented judge is therefore an impossibility. Even
though we cannot (except in astronomy) actually observe events that
occurred in the past, we can have enormous confidence in many facts
about them, for example that George Washington was the first President of the United States or that France was defeated in the FrancoPrussian war. But it is not facts to which judges and law professors
appeal when they are arguing about the interpretation and application
of constitutional and statutory provisions and previous judicial decisions. History in the narrow sense of what happened does not reveal
meaning. It might tell us what certain words in the U.S. Constitution
meant in the 1780s, or what the provenance of certain constitutional
provisions was, or what someone said about their meaning at the time;
but there is an unbridgeable gap between uninterpreted historical
data, on the one hand, and claims about the meaning of constitutional
provisions in cases decided today, on the other. The sorts of claims that
judges and law professors like to make about history are simply not
verifiable, because they depend not on facts but on disagreements
about the interpretive process itself. We know for example that the
framers and most of the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not regard blacks as the social or intellectual equals of whites, but we
do not know what to make of this bit of historical lore when the issue
is whether the amendment's equal protection clause forbids public
school segregation.
There are two problems here, not one. The first is the elusiveness
of historical Truth-not the truth of facts that compose a simple narrative or chronology, or even of statistical inferences from historical
data, but the truth of causal and evaluative assertions about history.
The second problem, which arises when the issue is the meaning of
some historical event or document, and thus an interpretive issue, is
the indeterminacy of the choice of interpretive approach. When one
law professor says that the equal protection clause is about securing
the basic political equality of blacks and another that it is about creating an evolving, generative concept of equality, their disagreement is
over interpretive theory and cannot be resolved by a deeper or better
study of history. History might reveal the interpretive presuppositions
of the drafters or ratifiers of an enactment, but it would not reveal the
weight that a modem interpreter should give to those presuppositions.
No doubt there are situations in which a knowledge of history,
and not just of the history of a doctrine, is important in legal decisionmaking. In interpreting the term "high Crimes and Misdemean53
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ors" in Article II of the Constitution, for example, we may not want to
stop with the eighteenth-century meaning of the term and with the
discussion of it in the constitutional convention, but we will probably
want to start theie; otherwise we may stumble badly over the word
"misdemeanor," which today means a minor crime but which then
had a much broader signification.! Even less problematic is the use of
history that Holmes himself most fancied, that of showing that a modem doctrine is just an historical vestige, and so ought to be discarded;
or the use of history to shoot down the ignorant historicism found in
too many judicial opinions.5'
There is no problem with judges using history in these, or for that
matter other, ways when there is a consensus among professional historians. But when there is not, the judges must find a method other
than history of resolving whatever legal dispute the history has been
brought to bear upon. Legal professionals are not competent to umpire historical disputes. Because they are not, inevitably they pick the
side of the dispute that coincides with their preferences based on different grounds altogether.
Sophisticated originalists know this. They do not want to substitute amateurish inconclusive debates over history for professional
but inconclusive debates over policy or values. They want, or at least
ought to want (for they often yield to the temptation of doing what legal historians with proper derision call "law office history"S6), a narrowly focused inquiry into precise and answerable questions of historical meaning of specific words and sentences, coupled with a list of
"canons of construction" that will enable those historical meanings to
be brought to bear on contemporary issues.
The originalists of the present day, such as Justice Scalia, are reacting to the exercise of free-wheeling judicial discretion by the courts
during the era of Earl Warren and, to only a slightly lesser extent, of
his successor, Warren Burger. The originalists want to minimize judi54 For example, Johnson's dictionary defines it as "offence; ill behaviour; [or] something
less than an atrocious crime." Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (Arno
1979). See also Richard A. Posner, An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment,and Trial
of PresidentClinton ch 3 (Harvard 1999).
55 For an example picked almost at random, consider United States v Curtiss-WrightExport
Corp,299 US 304,316-18 (1936), where the Supreme Court said that the war power of Congress
differs from the commerce power in not having been among the sovereign powers of the states
before the Constitution was promulgated. Charles Lofgren, a professional historian, pronounced
the historical discussion in Curtiss-Wright "shockingly inaccurate," and I do not believe that his
evaluation has been questioned. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 Yale L J 1, 32 (1973). See also Jack L. Goldsmith,
FederalCourtgForeignAffairs and Federalism,83 Va L Rev 1617,1660 n 184 (1997).
56 For examples of highly debatable historical excursus by originalist judges, see Plaut v
Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211,219-25 (1995); Michael H. v GeraldD., 491 US 110, 127 n 6
(1989) (Scalia) (plurality); United States v Lopez, 514 US 549,584 (1995) (Thomas concurring).
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cial discretion and they have devised a kind of algorithmic mechanism
for doing so. The historicists in law want no such thing. They mainly
want to forge an historical pedigree for their preferred positions in
order to deflect charges of judicial creativity. Richard Fallon has it
backwards when he suggests that disingenuous rhetoric is inherent in
pragmatic adjudication." A pragmatist might or might not adopt a
formalist rhetoric, historicist or otherwise; but the adoption of a historicist rhetoric is a sure sign that the judge is not disclosing the true
springs of decision.
Originalism is thus, in a queer but I think valid sense, a response
to the difficulty of resolving contested historical issues rather than a
school of historical jurisprudence. But those who are not much drawn
to originalism, and must cast about for some alternative to history as
the method of resolving cases, are open to the criticism that the difficulty of getting history right is relevant only if there is a simple alternative. If the alternative is policy analysis, as some pragmatists would
be inclined to answer, this may seem to be jumping from the frying
pan into the fire-substituting for one indeterminate inquiry another
equally indeterminate one. But in grappling with issues of policy the
judge is at least dealing with something that matters, and he can hope
to make some progress and reduce error. Moreover, he is facilitating
error-correction by not hiding behind a claim to possess an arcane
methodology impenetrable to "mere" policymakers and other noninitiates. And perfection in historical inquiry, even if attainable, would
answer one objection to historical inquiry but leave unanswered the
more basic one: why should the past rule the present?
III. HISTORICISM IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE CASE OF
BRUCE ACKERMAN

I have been discussing the risks of historicism for adjudication. It
poses risks for legal scholarship as well, as I shall argue with reference
57 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a ConstitutionalTheory,87 Cal L Rev 535,574
(1999). Fallon says that "by inviting judges to act on their personal views of what would make the
future better, pragmatism would authorize judicial behavior that offends both rule-of-law and
democratic values." Id. But pragmatism does not license decisionmaking according to personal
views, which would be mere willfulness; rather, it asks the judge to focus on the social consequences of his decisions. Fallon acknowledges that the pragmatist might want judges to consider
rule-of-law and democratic values, but infers from this that "pragmatist judges might therefore
follow established rules except where it would be very costly to do so, and they might write disingenuous opinions purporting to accept the authority of past decisions even when they were
setting out in new directions that they thought better for the future." Id. But why would they feel
constrained to write disingenuous opinions? Why could they not say, as judges frequently say,
that an existing rule must bend to take account of changed or special circumstances? The references in Fallon's discussion of pragmatic adjudication indicate that he derives his conception of it
not from anything that pragmatists have written but from Ronald Dworkin's tendentious characterizations.
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to one of the most ambitious historicist efforts of current legal scholarship-Bruce Ackerman's effort to prove that Article V of the
United States Constitution does not provide the exclusive method of
amending the Constitution. 8 I shall suggest despite my own misgivings
that Nietzsche might have looked approvingly on Ackerman's
method.
Article V creates a procedure, or rather two procedures, for
amending the Constitution. The first requires that each house of Congress approve a proposed amendment by a two-thirds vote and that
three-fourths of the states then ratify the proposal. The second requires Congress, upon the application of the legislatures of threefourths of the states, to convene a constitutional convention; any
amendment proposed by the convention must, as under the first procedure, be ratified by three-fourths of the states. The second procedure has never been used. The original Constitution was promulgated
by a convention and then ratified by the states, but of course it was not
a convention summoned pursuant to Article V, which did not yet exist.
As evidence that the Constitution can be amended without complying with Article V, Ackerman cites the amendments adopted after
the Civil War-the Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments. He
says that their adoption violated Article V in a variety of ways, but
what his argument boils down to is that the victorious North rammed
the amendments down the throat of an unwilling South. Without that
coercion, the amendments would not have been ratified, at least not as
soon as they were, by the required three-fourths of the states."
Ackerman further argues that the Constitution was amended
completely outside the precincts of Article V during the New Deal,
when no formal amendments were made except the ones, irrelevant to
his thesis, abolishing Prohibition and moving up the date on which the
President takes office after being elected from March to January. The
New Deal "amendments" that count for Ackerman are decisions by
the Supreme Court that expanded federal power over the economy
and shifted the emphasis in constitutional liberty from the economic
sphere to the political and the personal spheres. He does not consider
the absence of formal constitutional text a critical difference between
the Reconstruction and New Deal amendments. The significance of
the Reconstruction amendments lies not in what they said-lies not,

58 This is a major aim of Bruce Ackerman's projected trilogy, We the People, of which two
volumes have been published. See Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations (Belknap
1991); Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations (Belknap 1998). I focus here on the
second volume.
59 Ackerman, 2 We the People:Transformationsch 8 (cited in note 58).
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that is, in the enacted text-but in what they symbolized: a fundamental shift of power from the states to the federal government.0
Ackerman's precedent for the usurpative-seeming amendment
processes of the Reconstruction and the New Deal is the adoption of
the original Constitution. The framers exceeded their terms of reference from the Continental Congress. The Congress had authorized
convening a constitutional convention to amend the Articles of Confederation and the Articles required that amendments be unanimous,
despite which the convention specified that the new Constitution, displacing (and so radically "amending") the Articles of Confederation,
would take effect upon ratification by nine of the thirteen states. Ackerman believes that in all three instances compliance with the legally
prescribed requirements for amendment would have taken too long.
He concludes that, as a consequence of the informal amendments, the
United States has had not one but three constitutional regimes. We
live not under the 1787 Constitution as amended and interpreted, but
under the 1787 Constitution, a Reconstruction Constitution, and a
New Deal Constitution, all irregularly promulgated but nevertheless
valid.
Ackerman is not alone in believing that the "Constitution" we
live under today bears only a modest resemblance to the document
drafted more than two hundred years ago. But he does not regard this
situation, as others do, as the consequence of misinterpretations, judicial willfulness, or a felt need to adapt the written Constitution to social change through a process, namely judicial interpretation, less
cumbersome than the amendment process. He regards the divergence
between the original and today's "Constitution" as the consequence
of what he claims is the dualist nature of American politics. Most of
the time, Americans are apathetic about politics. This is the time of
"ordinary politics"-a sordid, at best uninspiring business of interestgroup politics, logrolling, lobbying, quasi-bribery, misrepresentations,
and general selfishness. But in times of crisis people become attentive
and involved. The policies that emerge during these periods of heightened public attention to political issues constitute a higher order of
lawmaking to which the courts and other agencies of government are
obliged to defer until the next upheaval yields a comparably authentic
expression of the popular will. It would thus be unconstitutional for
the Supreme Court to overrule the leading decisions of the New Deal
era, even if those decisions were erroneous interpretations of either
the original Constitution or the Reconstruction amendments; those
decisions are constitutional amendments.

60 Id.
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Ackerman's analysis would, if accepted, rehabilitate -though not
resurrect-a host of decisions by the Supreme Court that have
seemed either erroneous or at least questionable to most constitutional scholars. These decisions include Lochner"' (striking down a
state maximum-hours law), Adkins 2 (striking down a federal child labor law), Radford' (striking down a federal debtors' relief law), Griswold (striking down a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives
by married couples), and Roe.5 Ackerman argues that the first three
decisions appropriately honored the libertarian premises of the Reconstruction amendments. For, he claims, those amendments were intended to protect "free labor" not only by outlawing slavery but also6
contracts. 6
by preventing governmental interference with employment
The last two decisions, Griswold and Roe, honored the personallibertarian premises of the New Deal "amendments." Ackerman thus
challenges the conventional history of constitutional law, which denies
that the Constitution has been amended as extensively as Ackerman
believes, attributes overruled decisions such as Plessy/ and Lochner to
prejudice, error, or class bias rather than to supersession by constitutional amendment, and honors the dissenters in such cases (such as
the first Justice Harlan, Holmes, and Brandeis) rather than the authors
of the majority opinions.
Ackerman believes that Ronald Reagan, and more recently Newt
Gingrich, attempted to launch an extratextual amendment process
aimed at overruling the New Deal "amendments," but that Reagan
was thwarted when his nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme
Court failed Senate confirmation as was Gingrich when Clinton was
reelected President.
There is much to be said against Ackerman's argument from the
perspective of customary methods of legal and historical interpretation. The procedures specified in Article V for amending the Constitution are obviously designed to make amending difficult. They would
fail to do so if alternative, less demanding procedures could be employed by Congress or the Supreme Court to bring about the same result. Even if the alternative procedures were not, or not clearly, less
demanding, but merely different, their existence would inject a high
order of uncertainty into constitutional politics. Supporters and opponents of proposed legislation, or of proposed judicial interpretations
61 Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
62 Adkins v Children'sHospital,261 US 525 (1923).
63 Louisville JointStock Land Bank v Radford,295 US 555 (1935).
64 381 US 479.
65 410 US 113.

66 Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformationsch 9 (cited in note 58).
67 Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896).
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by the Supreme Court, could never be entirely sure whether they were
jousting over "mere" legislation or "mere" judicial interpretationsor over amendments to the Constitution. Congress would not know
when it was entitled to legislate in the ordinary way and when it must
use Article V, or how to proceed if it wanted to amend the Constitution without recourse to Article V (which, remember, Ackerman does
not believe is or should be the exclusive method of amending the
Constitution). If Congress tried to overrule a decision of the Supreme
Court by ordinary legislation, the Court could thwart Congress by declaring the decision to have constitutional stature; and so the approach
that Ackerman depicts and approves would, if generalized, alter the
balance of power between Congress and the courts, with unpredictable results.
Ackerman's approach of treating the structural features of the
Constitution as optional cannot logically be limited to Article V. The
approach implies that Congress or the President (or perhaps the
courts) might add to the federal government a third house of Congress, a dictator who would give orders to the President, a court empowered to review decisions by state courts on matters of state law, or
a separate mode of impeaching and removing the President-for none
of these additions is expressly forbidden by the Constitution. If Article
V is not a limitation on congressional power, why should any of the
other provisions that establish the structure of the federal government
be treated as limitations?
Ackerman's approach makes Article V inadequate, rather than
revealing and curing its inadequacy. If judges did not enforce extratextual amendments-if, for example, they had not held much of the early
New Deal legislation unconstitutional because (on Ackerman's interpretation of what the Supreme Court was doing-and rightly doing) it
infringed the extratextual Reconstruction amendments-there would
be little need for recourse to Article V and hence little pressure to circumvent it. The New Deal legislation would have been upheld (most
of it, anyway), and so Roosevelt would not have had to try to coerce
the Supreme Court by proposing his Court-packing plan. Ackerman
proliferates constitutional amendments. His Constitution is longer
than anyone else's, and the more provisions a Constitution has, the
easier the amending process must be made in order to prevent govermental paralysis.
Strict adherence to Article V as the exclusive mode of amending
the Constitution would not, as Ackerman argues, have required the
Court to invalidate the Reconstruction amendments. The Court could
have taken-in fact has taken-the position that Congress has the final say on when an amendment shall be deemed adopted and in
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force.6 The Court based this decision on the "political question" doctrine, which the Court invented and occasionally applies when necessary to avoid massive intrusions into the operations of other branches
of government. Legal formalists may decry such prudential abstentions, but Ackerman is not a formalist and never makes clear why he
considers the "political question" route an unsatisfactory means of legitimizing the Reconstruction amendments, though he might argue
that the doctrine avoids rather than resolves the issue of legality.
Nor is it clear that the Reconstruction amendments were the
product of "coercion" in a pejorative sense of the term. The Civil War
began with an unprovoked attack by South Carolina on Fort Sumter.
The national government was entitled to defend itself, and the occupation of an enemy's territories is a lawful outcome of a lawful war.
The military governments installed by the national government at the
conclusion of the Civil War hence were lawful and could have compelled the congressional delegation of each of the occupied states to
vote for the proposed amendments and could have then, when Congress adopted them by the requisite supermajority and sent them to
the states, voted to ratify them. So it is far from clear that the Reconstruction amendments violated Article V. Nor could the original Constitution have violated it. Two of the three struts of Ackerman's historical analysis collapse. And the third, the idea that a number of judicial decisions during the New Deal era have constitutional status, is
the least plausible because of the absence of any textual "handle" corresponding to the original Constitution or the Reconstruction
amendments.
But my interest is less in the soundness of Ackerman's historicolegal argument than in his conception of history. It lies at the opposite
extreme from history conceived as a collection of data, and in its abstractness and interpretive ambitions would place upon the courts the
unworkable burden of identifying constitutional "moments" and determining which aspects of them should be accorded constitutional
dignity. His type of historiography would place a heavy burden on critics of the courts as well. The conformity of a judicial decision to the
text or background or purpose of particular constitutional provisions,
or to past decisions interpreting those provisions, or to sensible public
policy, or to other values, would be irrelevant to an evaluation of the
decision's soundness. The only relevant conformity would be to some
past Zeitgeist.

The difficulty of this style of historicizing is shown by Ackerman's
attempt at it. Key decisions of the Supreme Court refute him. In cases
like Plessy the Supreme Court refused to recognize liberty of contract;
68
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this suggests, contrary to Ackerman's argument, that the Court was
not enforcing some extratextual Reconstruction amendment that
guaranteed such liberty against curtailment by the states. The Supreme Court left Jim Crow, an affront to federal power, severely alone
during the entire period of the "Reconstruction Constitution" that in
Ackerman's view decisively strengthened federal power over the
states.
Cases like Brown" and Griswold cannot be attributed to the New
Deal "amendments"; neither public school education nor sexual liberty was an interest of the New Deal. Moreover, Ackerman's interpretation of the Bork nomination as an effort to repeal the New Deal
"amendments" is equally groundless. Had Reagan been able to fill up
the Supreme Court with Borks and Scalias, Roe might have been overruled, affirmative action declared unconstitutional, prayer allowed in
public schools, the constitutional rights of criminal defendants further
curtailed, and the power of the federal government over the states reduced. Only the last item on this agenda-which at this writing a less
conservative Supreme Court is nevertheless pursuing vigorouslywould have brushed up against New Deal legislation, and then only
lightly. Indeed, the net effect of the overrulings by a Bork-Scalia Court
would be to return constitutional law to where it was when FDR died!
Neither Bork nor Scalia believes that Lochner,Adkins, or any of the
other decisions that constituted the Reconstruction Constitution were
correctly decided. Neither believes in constitutionalizing economic
rights la Richard Epstein, who believes that Lochner was correctly
decided and that much of the New Deal was unconstitutional.0
Ackerman particularly wishes to establish the similarity of the
three constitutional moments that he has identified to each other and
their dissimilarity to the failed fourth moment of Reagan and
Gingrich. This exercise in historical analogy-making carries Ackerman
deep into the archives. The body of primary and secondary materials
relevant to an understanding of the three historical periods that Ackerman studies is vast; only a historian can evaluate Ackerman's selection from and interpretation of it.7' Ackerman is not a historian, and
historical research is only a part of his academic work. History, like
69 Brown v Board of Education,347 US 483 (1954).
70 Richard A. Epstein, Takings: PrivateProperty and the Power of Eminent Domain279-81
(Harvard 1985).
71 For assessments (both critical and admiring) of Ackerman's project by professional historians and others, see Symposium, Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism, 108 Yale L J 1917 (1999); Colin Gordon, Book Review, Rethinking the New Deal, 98
Colum L Rev 2029 (1998); Larry Kramer, What's a Constitutionfor Anyway? Of History and
Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal,46 Case W Res L Rev 885 (1996); Michael J. Klarman, ConstitutionalFact/ConstitutionalFiction:A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of ConstitutionalMoments,44 Stan L Rev 759 (1992).
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most academic fields, is increasingly specialized. The more specialized
a field, the greater the disadvantage of the nonspecialist; the more
"amateurism" becomes a danger and a deserved reproach.72
No one will deny the ingenuity of the historical parallels that
Ackerman draws. He matches the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which
he treats as having amended Article V of the Constitution by conditioning the readmission of the southern states' senators and congressmen to Congress upon those states' voting to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment, with Article VII, which had diluted the unanimity requirement of the Articles of Confederation. He matches the radical
Republicans who controlled Congress during Reconstruction to
Franklin Roosevelt, and matches Andrew Johnson-the border-state
President who was Lincoln's successor and opposed the radical Republicans-to the Supreme Court that tried (at first with some success) to thwart the New Deal. For Ackerman, the fact that these powerful efforts to prevent the "enactment" of the irregular amendments
(coerced, in the case of the Reconstruction amendments, and nontextual, in the case of the New Deal amendments) failed-that the current of reform was able to overcome such resistance-proves the
strength of the popular will and thus verifies the existence of true constitutional moments. More, it shows that the failure of regular enactment in the Reconstruction and New Deal eras was a trivial detail, on
par with a misspelling in a judicial commission. Had President Johnson not flinched during the trial of his impeachment, he would have
been convicted, removed from office, and replaced by a radical; if Secretary of State Seward had refused to proclaim the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would have overridden him; and if
the Supreme Court in 1937 had not abandoned its opposition to the
New Deal, Roosevelt's Court-packing plan would have been enacted.7
I do not know whether these or any of the other counterfactual
claims or "alternative histories" with which Ackerman's book is studded are true. (The one about Johnson is the most plausible.) That is
for professional historians to say, if they can. My guess is they will say
it is impossible to speculate responsibly about such counterfactuals,
posed by Ackerman, as Lincoln's having survived his second term or
Roosevelt's having failed to survive his first term, enabling John
Nance Garner to become President and play Andrew Johnson's role
in resisting a radical Congress. No "laws" of history predict the outcomes of these counterfactuals. The student of Nietzsche will be
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tempted to remark that Ackerman's study of history is not oriented to
issues of truth at all.
Even if Ackerman with the benefit of hindsight could answer all
the "what if" questions correctly, it would not follow that, as he believes, judges should dispense with the formalities of enactment by attempting to answer counterfactual questions about recent or contemporary controversies. The logic of Ackerman's approach is that if a
court were confident that some law would be passed by Congress and
signed by the President, but for some irrelevant reason (maybe just an
oversight by the clerical staff in one of the houses of Congress, or a
filibuster on an unrelated issue) it was not enacted, the court could go
ahead and enforce it as if it had been enacted. Formalist readers of
Ackerman may come away with their faith strengthened, and pragmatists may be forced to acknowledge that formalism has a legitimately
pragmatic role to play in law. The statute under which Seward acted,
requiring the Secretary of State to certify as valid a constitutional
amendment when it has been ratified by the requisite number of
states, begins to be a rather appealing formality; Ackerman calls the
certification a "legalistic piece of paper." 7'
Ackerman's effort to identify three constitutional "moments"three peaks in U.S. history-and consign the rest of our history to the
plains is excessively schematic. He ignores such other plausible candidates for moments of heightened public attention to political matters
as the Revolutionary War itselt which produced the Declaration of
Independence (which Lincoln always treated as one of the founding
documents of the American "Constitution") and the Articles of Confederation; the first few decades under the Constitution, with the tug
of war between the Federalists (including John Marshall) and the Jeffersonian Republicans over whether the national government would
be effective; the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, which inaugurated
populist democracy; and the Progressive era, embracing the Presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, which gave us trustbusting, the Federal Reserve Act, the national park system, and the
independent civil service.
The second volume of Ackerman's trilogy ends with a radical
proposal for amending Article V-extraconstitutionally of course. The
proposal is to empower the President, upon being reelected, to propose constitutional amendments that would be placed on the ballot at
the next two Presidential elections and if passed would become formal
amendments to the Constitution. In other words, a President popular
enough to be reelected would be empowered to sponsor two referenda spaced four years apart, and concordance of the results of the
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referenda would make the proposals part of the Constitution. The
proposal would be embodied in a statute that would provide that it
would take effect if proposed by a second-term President and passed
by a two-thirds majority of Congress and then supported by the voters
at the next two Presidential elections. In other words, like the original
Constitution, the statute would prescribe its own mode of achieving
the status of a constitutional provision. "
The motive behind this proposal is obscure, as it is not addressed
to the historical events that provide Ackerman's evidence for its needfulness. It is irrelevant to the founding; and as for Reconstruction, a
proposal for constitutional amendments under the procedure advocated by Ackerman could not have been made until 1872, when Grant
was reelected, or adopted until 1880-by which time Reconstruction
was over and no Reconstruction amendment could have passed. The
New Deal amendments could not have been made until 1936, when
Roosevelt was reelected, or adopted until 1944, when World War II
was in full flow and the New Deal largely forgotten. The proposal is
addressed to problems that have not arisen and may never arise, while
failing to address the problems that give rise to it.
The disjunction between the history that Ackerman narrates (or
creates) and the proposal for policy change in which his historicizing
culminates is a further indication that he does not see history as a
source of data that may cast warning and other lights on the problems
of today, in the way, for example, that the economic crisis between the
election and inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt suggested the need to
compress the Presidential lame-duck period. The crises that Ackerman recounts were overcome more satisfactorily than they would
have been had his proposal been in effect, because his proposal requires a longer period of time for implementing reform than would
have been feasible. Rather, Ackerman sees history in its interpretive
as distinct from its factual sense as the appropriate method of legitimizing a radical proposal: the proposal is okay because something
like it was used in the past. The pragmatic social reformer will not be
happy with such an approach. He is less interested in whether a radical proposal has a pedigree, let alone an invented one, than in whether
its benefits outweigh its costs. He would prefer Ackerman to concentrate on that question, the answer to which is more dubious than he
assumes, rather than to build historical sand castles.
Ackerman does not believe that the past is normative or want to
return us to the original understanding of the Constitution-amending
process. His aim is to make his radical proposal seem natural by presenting historical analogies to it and desirable by identifying historical
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crises that might have been averted had something like his proposal
(for I have noted the oddity that the proposal itself would not have
averted any of them) been in effect. But these are just other ways than
that of Blackstone or Savigny or their avatars in which lawyers' historicizing is marked as rhetorical rather than scientific in a way that
Nietzsche's critique of the study of history can help us to understand- and maybe to forgive. Nietzsche, we recall, commended the use
of history by "the man of deeds and power, [ ] him who fights a great
fight, who needs models, teachers, comforters and cannot find them
among his contemporaries." (p 67). We might think of Ackerman as
reaching back to the great men of the past for models and teachers in
his work of overcoming the limitations of Article V. If he is right that
the Constitution has been amended extratextually in the past, and if
the nation would have been better off if this had been recognized,
maybe the Constitution can and should be amended extratextually in
the future. History reveals possibilities and by doing so emboldens us
to consider changes in our current methods. An exercise in selective
remembrance and selective forgetting, Ackerman's project may come
closer than that of other legal historicists to satisfying Nietzschean criteria for constructive engagement with history. This conclusion may,
however, raise doubts about the normative significance of the constructive aspect of Nietzsche's essay.
Consider the type of history that Nietzsche himself did, notably in
On the Genealogy of Morals.Though the Genealogy purports to be a
history of morality, it is unlike anything a professional historian would
write-or, rather, would have written before the profession's recent
rediscovery, in the spirit of Nietzsche, that "history can be redescribed
as a discourse that is fundamentally rhetorical, and that representing
the past takes place through the creation of powerful, persuasive images which can be best understood as created objects, models, metaphors or proposals about reality."7 6 The Genealogy is edifying rather
than scientific history-an argument that is cast in narrative, in historical, form for the sake of vividness, rather than being an attempt to
"get right" the events in history. It is historicizing in the service of life,
and in like manner we might consider Ackerman's trilogy in the service of life-or at least in the attempted service of life.
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